specificity, and greater budget execution oversight. More recently, Congress has deliberated over and voted for appropriations to pay for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the same issues with respect to delegation of congressional budgetary authority and control raised during the Vietnam War era have been debated anew since the United States initiated military response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.
The degree of resource decision flexibility and delegation of authority from Congress to the Department of Defense (DOD) has been examined by observers of congressional defense budgeting and management for decades.
1 Delegation of budget authority is an important issue because it is highly relevant to (a) congressional assessment of defense budget priorities and how best to enforce its policy preferences in DOD budgeting, (b) analysis of proposals to reformulate defense programs and budget priorities, (c) how to execute defense spending to greatest benefit, (d) selection of alternative appropriation strategies within Congress, and (e) analysis of the effects of congressional control on DOD budget execution and management practices.
The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Congress have long been asserted by DOD leadership. For example, DOD Comptroller Robert Anthony developed an extensive plan for reorganizing defense accounting and budgeting under Project Prime in the mid-1960s, but Congress rejected the proposal. 2 Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci asked Congress for increased resource and managerial powers at the end of the Reagan administration in 1988. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney proposed six acquisition programs in the 1991-1994 time frame for execution without congressional oversight as a test of the DOD's ability to operate efficiently independent of external micromanagement. Despite considerable congressional lip service to the effect that these proposals would increase program management and budget execution efficiency and better ''bang for the buck'' in defense, Congress supported neither Carlucci's nor Cheney's request.
Most recently, Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld offered a set of legislative proposals under the umbrella title, Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act. Included among the proposals were requests for greater autonomy in budget execution. Congress largely ignored the budgetary proposals and devoted most of their attention to the more public proposal (creation of the National Security Personnel System). Given this longstanding absence of trust of DOD management and budgetary judgment, it is significant when Congress deviates from traditional patterns of control. This is why examination of the case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) is worthwhile. In approving the DERF Congress appeared to be investing a significant degree of trust in DOD management and budget execution capability.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the case study of the DERF to determine (a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to the Department of Defense (DOD), (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation initially provided in the DERF after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us about the constantly evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the DOD.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE BUDGET EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT
Much has been written about congressional tendencies to ''micromanage'' the Defense Department explaining the incentives, describing the costs and benefits of its effects, debating whether it should occur, and documenting the manner in which it occurs. In this section, that literature is quickly summarized to provide a foundation for understanding Congress' propensity for activism. Such a foundation is necessary for making sense of why Congress delegated authority to the executive in the DERF appropriation then later rescinded that authority. The literature is fairly consistent in the analysis of why Congress tends to micromanage DOD, with respect to theoretical hypotheses on the variables that explain close congressional oversight and absence of delegation. In summary, Congress has traditionally exercised control as constitutional prerogative, 3 to shape defense policy, 4 in response to media publicity of defense mismanagement, 5 and because of partisan congressional-executive branch competition and occasional mistrust. 6 As the defense budget has historically accounted for at least half of all federal discretionary spending, it is a favorite target for those legislators seeking to influence federal spending even for It is not only important to examine why Congress tends to control defense, but it is also useful to examine the manner in which that oversight occurs. The literature provides us with a framework of tools including restrictions on the use of funding, tools for gathering information, and accounting requirements. Regarding the use of funding, they may make line item adjustments to the budget 9 ; earmark funds for specific purposes 10 ; place restrictions on the reprogramming and transfer of funds between accounts 11 ; and restrict funds pending executive compliance with provisions of law or committee reports.
12 They gather information formally in congressional hearings and informally between congressional and DOD staff outside of hearings or through the use of reviews, audits, and investigations by committee staff, General Accounting Office (GAO), and CRS. 13 Finally, Congress may place requirements on program execution or may specify reports on myriad topics. 14 Strong incentives are present for Congress to actively micromanage defense policy and budgets, and congressional rules and procedures provide many means by which to control DOD through authorization, appropriation, and oversight. The case study of the DERF, as explained in the sections of the paper that follows, illustrates how Congress responded to this budgetary incentive structure from 2001 to 2003. The purpose in investigating this case in detail is to determine more specifically under what circumstances Congress chooses to exercise more or less control over the DOD management and budgeting.
RESPONSE TO CRISIS: A CASE STUDY
From September 2001 to October 2003, the DERF was used by Congress to delegate budget authority to the DOD. DERF was an account designed to provide flexibility in times of crisis, to provide obligation authority when a need arises, but before the specifics and was provided $100 million of obligation authority without FY limitation to its use. These funds were to be used for reimbursement of other appropriations when used by the Defense Department in support of state and local governments when responding to natural or manmade disasters. Reimbursements would be deposited in the fund and would remain available until expended. As originally conceived, DERF was not a mechanism for funding Defense Department military activities overseas; instead it was designed to facilitate the use of the department to address domestic problems (e.g., fighting forest fires).
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Military actions overseas were traditionally funded through existing operations accounts if they were sufficient or through emergency supplemental appropriations. 16 Given the increased frequency of contingency operations since the end of the Cold War, in February 2001 the DOD updated the Financial Management Regulations to specifically address the issue of funding contingency operations. 17 It is DOD policy not to budget for contingency operations, but rather to budget for a peacetime military. DOD further ''requires that controls, accounting systems, and procedures provide, in financial records, proper identification and recording of costs incurred in supporting contingency operations. '' 18 Having autonomy in budget execution is useful when faced with emergencies that were not part of the Department's original budget. This became especially true in the 1990s when the armed forces were used overseas six times more frequently than during the Cold War. 19 However, this policy document explicitly states that wartime activities are not covered and represent an exception to Defense budgeting. States. While the funds had intentionally few restrictions ex ante, there were ex post requirements placed on the executive branch. For example, $10 billion was provided immediately, $10 billion more was available within 15 days of notification by OMB to Congress of the planned use of the funds, and the remaining $20 billion was available only after subsequent request and enactment, and the bill required periodic reporting of transfers and outlays.
Between September 21 and November 30, 2001, the president provided Congress details on the use of the first $20 billion and on October 17, 2001, requested the remaining $20 billion. The Defense Department portion of the first $20 billion totaled $13.74 billion and of the second increment, $7.4 billion. During this time, OMB issued Bulletin 02-01 which provided reporting requirements to the heads of agencies. OMB promised Congress quarterly reports, on the condition that OMB obtained monthly information from the executive agencies. The reports required data on obligations and outlays in 10 broad spending categories. Of note is that these 10 categories do not correspond with either the DOD's 11 major force programs or the structure of its regular appropriations. These distinctions proved problematic when accounting for the DERF. A view of the first DOD report is provided in Table 1 .
How can we explain Congressional actions? The political atmosphere the week after the terrorist attacks was one of self-preservation through unity. Bipartisan and intragovernmental politics are viewed as petty during a crisis. There was a clear understanding that recovery and response would be expensive and that providing funding was one of the few tangible acts Congress could take. Referring to Congress, Stephen J. Wayne of Georgetown University was quoted in Congressional Quarterly, ''Their role at the moment is to cheer [the president] on, to show unity and give him what he wants.'' 20 The administration requested $20 billion without restrictions and Congress was nearly willing to provide it, when a few members raised concerns, most notably Rep. David R. Obey (D-WI), ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee. ''The problem is, when you give any White House $20 billion with not a single string attached . . . you have abdicated Congress' responsibility,'' said Obey. 21 The ensuing compromise was the $40 billion appropriation described above. The incentives for Congress were to appear unified and to support the nation through the appropriation of funds as expeditiously as possible. Doing so without unduly eroding their constitutional authority over the power of the purse was almost an afterthought.
The September 2001 emergency supplemental appropriation (PL 107-38) placed the entire sum in an emergency response fund at the Executive Office of the President. The act provided the president authority to transfer funds ''to any authorized Federal Government activity'' and a portion of the funds became DERF when transferred to the DOD. This was a logical account in which to place the fundsFit already existed and was created for disaster response. Per the design of DERF and the language of the supplemental appropriation, the funds could be used by the Defense Department for any type of expenditure in response to and recovery from the terrorist attacks. The funds could not, however, be easily transferred to other DOD appropriations. Subsequent transfer authority was not provided with the supplemental appropriation. Many defense activities spent considerable sums from other appropriation titles, such as Operations and Maintenance, on recovery and response tasks. While these obligations were necessary to meet urgent requirements, without specific transfer authority, they may have been in violation of the fiscal law that prohibits using funds ''otherwise provided for'' and the improper augmentation of one appropriation with funds from another. The Defense Department sought legislative approval to transfer obligation authority from DERF to these other appropriations to reimburse those expenses that would be more appropriately paid with DERF. the exact amounts already transferred (or requested) by the administration, validating the administration's judgment in the allocation of these funds. Section 1506 further codified the reporting mandated in the supplemental appropriations bill. While this was authorizing, not appropriating legislation, the transfer authority was granted and allowed the department significant latitude by giving lower echelon commands the ability to spend available dollars with the expectation of being reimbursed by DERF. It is also significant in that Congress affirmed the administration's discretion on the use of the original $40 billion.
DERF was considered a blessing at the lower-level commands. The deputy comptroller for the Navy Special Warfare Command said, ''The primary advantage of DERF for field operators was its lack of appropriation restrictions such as funds expiration and investment threshold. There was no obligation rate or year-end pressure so funds could be planned more effectively. There were no procurement [threshold] restrictions so operators could get what they needed. '' 22 Ordinarily, Congressional appropriations are restricted by their purpose, a time horizon, and the amount. Thus, the economic rationality of an individual spending decision is constrained by the political objectives which defined the appropriation. For example, only items that cost under $250,000 may be purchased with operations and maintenance funds even if a more economical item (say, in net present value terms) is priced slightly above the threshold. With DERF, only the grand total amount was constrained, which permitted the comptrollers within the department to execute in a more economically rational fashion. The same comptroller said, ''Some new stuff made it to the field that never went thru [sic] the requirements process. That would have been impossible under normal appropriation law and procurement rules. My impression is that the upper levels of DOD management didn't like that much freedom in the field. It's too messy and excludes the central authority from the decision process. From an accounting standpoint DERF was a better way to do business. '' 23 Those in the field did, however, acknowledge other accounting difficulties. Recall that the accounting categories for DERF did not align with Defense Department normal appropriations or the major force program structure used for budgeting. The comptroller noted, ''In Aviation Maintenance, for example, it would have been nearly impossible to separate out dollars for parts spent on contingency missions from dollars spent on other missions. You would only have flying hour estimates. The view of Congress was that they poured in money and DOD couldn't show where they had spent the money.'' 
ADDING RESTRICTIONS TO DERF
The DOD and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 (PL 107-117) were enacted in early January 2002 and appropriated an additional $3,395.6 million into DERF, directing the funds into six of the 10 spending categories. Of note is that these funds were directly appropriated into DERF (the September appropriation was provided to the president who later transferred it into DERF), so these funds are slightly more restricted ex ante than were the initial funds. Also of note are several earmarks, including $500,000 for the White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, a transfer of $775 million to the Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Revolving Fund, and the authority to obligate up to $100 million for payments to Pakistan and Jordan for logistical and military support. Wide transfer authority was provided but with the requirements for quarterly reports from the Secretary of Defense specifying the project and accounts to which funds were transferred. While it is quite common for such earmarks to occur in the annual appropriations bill, these were the first earmarks attached specifically to the emergency response fund. Table 2 displays these various pieces of legislation and other congressional actions, noting when they occurred and the control instrumentation used by Congress and its audit arm, the GAO, to influence DOD budget execution.
Emboldened by the flexible budgetary authority provided by the Congress, the administration presented to Congress the FY 2003 budget including in it a request for $19.4 billion in DERF. Of that figure, $9.4 billion was identified to specific programs affected by the war of terrorism, for example, the replacement of munitions, the cost to refurbish equipment, and the cost to replenish supplies. ''The remaining $10 billion ... is the pure wartime contingency,'' Defense Department Comptroller Dov Zakheim testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee. ''So it was a very conservative estimate that we needed for planning purposes and, as the secretary of defense said, to signal to everybody that we are committed to carry on. '' 25 In essence, the administration requested for the subsequent FY (eight months in advance of the start of the year) a $10 billion contingency fund in an account that had few restrictions. This was considered a contingency request in that Congress would appropriate the funds, but the president would be required to notify Congress of the need for the funds before he could access them. Congress historically had been reluctant to appropriate such funds because of their undefined and tentative nature, preferring to fund such contingenciesFif they occurFwith supplemental appropriations.
Including DERF in the annual budget was an unusual request. As noted earlier, the Defense Department does not, as a matter of policy, budget for contingency operations. Supplemental appropriations had been the traditional method of acquiring additional resources and took the form of specific requests for specific items to address the contingency. Reaching further in March 2002, on the heels of the FY2003 budget, the president requested an additional FY 2002 supplemental appropriation for the war on terrorism, assistance to New York City, homeland security, and other needs. Part of this $27.1 billion request was $14 billion for DOD of which $11.3 billion was requested in the form of DERF. By this time, Congress was not inclined to lightly consider these requests.
In an attempt to gauge DOD ability to manage such funds, the appropriations committees used a common micromanagement tool asking the GAO to examine DOD's accounting for recent contingency operations. GAO noted that the accounting was generally good, but that there were instances of questionable costs being attributed to contingency operations. The appropriations committees made this issue a highlight of the spring hearings that were considering the FY 2002 supplemental and the FY 2003 regular appropriations. 26 During homeland security hearings in May 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee raised the issues cited in the GAO reports and asked the secretary of defense, How can you assure this committee that any supplemental appropriations provided in the Defense Emergency Response Fund will be used only for the costs of the war, and not for unrelated or frivolous items? I wonder what kind of strings we might be able to write into the appropriations bills that will give to the elected representatives of the people in the legislative branch the wherewithal that they may be assured that appropriate accountability is being given to the expenditure of the taxpayers' money. 27 Political realities, however, were less idealistic and more pragmatic. This bill was very likely to pass since it was portrayed as primarily providing relief to New York City. Unrelated items of congressional constituent interest became riders and the bill grew to $28.9 billion, including $11.9 billion of DERF. Congress did attach strings: the DERF authority was earmarked for transfer into several accounts, the bill contained military construction funds for Army Corps of Engineers projects in seven different states, and the bill added special interest items including rules on immigration, the international criminal court, international AIDS programs, Pell student financial aid grants, Amtrak support, and federal nutrition programs (American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002). The administration received as much funding as they requested and most of the flexible spending authorities. However, these new funds were, in effect, simply reimbursement for those appropriations that were used in the time between requesting the supplemental and its enactment five months later. 
CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS FOR DELEGATED AUTHORITY
In the heat of the moment in September 2001, Congress provided broad budget execution authority to the executive branch, but in time was less willing to grant such authority. The Bush administration, on the other hand, was becoming bolder in its requests for delegation. At least through the first year since the terrorist attacks, Congress was willing to provide the administration more than the quantity of funds requested and most of the flexibility. But the trend showed increasing use of the tools of micromanagement. Congressional resistance to further delegation was grounded in two arguments: Defense Department accounting practices were unreliable and constitutional separation of powers.
Evidence on accounting problems was abundant and in some cases legendary. The Defense Department is one of three agencies still unable to achieve an unqualified Chief Financial Officer's Act-required audit opinion on their financial statements, and the best estimate is that it will be several years before this is possible. This reflects on the federal government at large: most of the material weaknesses preventing the federal government from earning an unqualified audit opinion stem from poor accounting practices within the Defense Department.
28 DOD had longstanding problems accounting for contingency operations: ''We found that limited guidance and oversight combined with a lack of costconsciousness contributed to the questionable expenditure of contingency funds. '' 29 More importantly, Congress was leery of the constitutional issue raised by the administration's requests. They were unwilling to let go of their constitutional authority (Article I, Sections 8 and 9) to direct through the power of the purse what the DOD will do, when they will do it, and to what level of effort. The administration countered by offering an accounting of expenditures from the fund in lieu of restrictions on its use. Congressional response was to cite that the Constitution not only assigns them the responsibility to appropriate funds, but also requires a periodic accounting and reporting of expenditures. That offer, Congress retorted, was hollow since it already was a requirement.
The deliberations over the $30 billion supplemental bill in the spring and summer of 2002 consumed a disproportionate amount of attention from the Congressional committees involved in budgeting, authorizing programs, and appropriating the funds for them. In addition to the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security, the supplemental was one more distraction at a time when Congress was struggling with the dilemma of the reversal of the nation's financial outlook. A year earlier, projections were commonplace that budget surpluses would exist for the foreseeable future, the national debt would be managed, and alternative plans for ''saving'' Social Security were In July 2002, the president amended his FY 2003 budget request by deleting the contingency clause on the request for $10 billion DERF. It was determined that the contingency was a certainty and allocations were provided for personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement accounts. The administration also requested the flexibility to move funds between these accounts. The appropriations committee placed the $10 billion in the accounts approximately as described in the July budget amendment, but did not grant the administration the requested transfer authority. While the administration intended the allocation to be loosely defined targets, they were appropriated as firm figures.
The Bush administration took one more opportunity to request flexibility. The war on terrorism reached the point where world leaders anticipated (and some opposed) a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This would be expensive, the planned military operations were unconventional, and the administration made a case for budget flexibility in the supplemental budget request submitted less than a week after major fighting began in Iraq. The March 25, 2003, memo read, in part, This request reflects urgent and essential requirements. Much of the funding has been requested with flexible authorities. This flexibility will ensure requirements can be immediately addressed as they arise despite the unpredictable scope, duration and intensity of operations. I ask the Congress to appropriate the funds as requested, and promptly send the bill to me for signature. I urge the Congress to refrain from attaching items not directly related to the emergency at hand.
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The Defense Department portion of the budget request totaled $62.6 billion, of which $59.9 billion was requested as DERF. The uses for the DERF were described in very broad terms; amounts qualified with phrases like ''up to'' and ''at least.'' Also requested was wide-sweeping transfer authority, including the retroactive reimbursement of accounts tapped to fund the military buildup and the authority to support the military operations of foreign nations. The requested transfer authority extended beyond the supplemental dollars. The memo requested that the language in the FY 2003 Defense Appropriations bill be revised to raise the transfer authority from $2 billion to ''2.5 percent of the total amount appropriated.'' This equates to approximately $9 billion. The department further proposed separate accounting for the funds and quarterly reporting. The request included $250 million for the Executive Office of the President Emergency Response Fund for ''unanticipated needs.'' These funds would be available for transfer to any federal agency ''for immediate or emerging terrorism-related prevention requirements throughout the federal government. '' 32 Given the scope of mobilization for the Iraqi phase of the war on terrorism, it was common knowledge that the administration would need this supplemental funding. Congress asked the GAO to conduct a review on the previous DERF appropriations. GAO reported that OMB provided adequate guidance, but DOD provided no further clarification and those charged with spending the DERF interpreted guidance in various ways, diminishing the quality of accounting for costs. Further, GAO noted the differences between the 10 OMB accounting categories and DOD's regular appropriation structures. As DERF was transferred into other accounts, the funds were commingled, further complicating the accounting. DOD required the use of contingency operations accounting practices as articulated in the Financial Management Regulations, but they, too, did not align with the OMB requirements. In short, DOD had difficulty reporting accurately the use of prior DERF appropriations. this committee and the Congress, to pay back money that had already been spent. It's just a terrible way to operate.'' Sen. Byrd: ''Well, Mr. Secretary, I understand it may be a terrible way, but we're talking about the expenditure of the taxpayers' money. . . . There are limitations, there will be limitations, there ought to be limitations. Why this situation is so different, I can't understand. This country has fought several wars, and much more major than this war will probably be, insofar as length of time for the war and its duration the costs and the loss of manpower, and so on. So I see no reasonFlet me say againFfor Congress to extend these flexibilities.'' 35 A few days later on the Senate floor, Senator Byrd spoke on the issue in an impassioned speech:
For decades, Presidential administrations have sought to wrap their fingers around the purse strings, push away the Congress, and ignore the Constitution. . . . It does not matter what administration it is. It does not matter the political party of the President. What matters is nothing more than raw power. . . . Congress has it. The executive branch wants it. The cry went out: ''Give us flexibility. . . . But it was not really flexibility that the administration wanted; it was power, power, power over the purse, power over the Congress. Wisely, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees limited this power grab in this supplemental request. '' 36 Further, there was significant skepticism in the media regarding the appropriateness of the Iraq phase of the war on terrorism and the manner in which it was being conducted. This criticism of the administration resonated with some members of Congress and in some constituent communities.
Congress moved very quickly on the supplemental appropriation bill. Hearings were completed by April 7 and a conference committee convened on April 8. The committee reported out on April 12 and both houses of Congress passed the bill the same day. The president signed the supplemental appropriation a few days later. While the Defense Department received the $62.6 billion it requested, it did not contain the desired flexibility. Said the undersecretary of defense (comptroller), ''We didn't get everything we wanted. We asked for a lot more in the way of flexibility, in the region of $59 billion. If you parse what the actual language of the bill is and report language and so on, you see that the flexibility is closer to between 10 1/2 and 11 billion.'' 
DISCUSSION
This research found that, first, Congress delegated budget authority to DOD under crisis conditions, where it is perceived that such flexibility is warranted and must be provided expeditiously to assist the president in responding to a national security emergency. There was little debate in Congress on whether funds should be appropriated for defense; nearly all members were in agreement. Thus, in the first supplemental appropriation after 9-11, Congress delegated authority to DOD because of the exigency of the situation, similar to the practice of providing minimally constrained emergency appropriations in response to natural disasters. 39 Second, Congress initially delegated considerable authority but then serially withdrew much of this delegation over time for DERF and other defense supplemental appropriations. One finds Congress gradually returning to traditional methods of oversight: hearings and testimony, reporting requirements, reprogramming and transfer restrictions, earmarked funds, reviews and investigations by legislative entities, and the fencing of funds pending compliance with provisions.
Finally, this case is quite instructive about the evolution of the budgetary relationship between Congress and DOD. Presidential administrations have sought increased delegation of authority and control over budget execution over the past four decades, particularly as congressional oversight of the budget increased. Immediately after the September 2001 terrorist attacks when the scope and nature of the U.S. response was unclear, Congress was fairly comfortable with Bush administration requests for increased budget execution autonomy. As Congress initially accommodated the request, the Bush administration was emboldened to ask for increasingly more autonomy. Congress, in turn, expressed increased concern over the shift of constitutional authority and became more dubious of the ''you can trust us'' attitude of the Bush administration and DOD. Reasons included doubt about U.S. antiterrorism initiatives, especially the war in Iraq, and longstanding budget, management, and accounting problems within DOD. As Congress tightened control, the administration was compelled to ask for even greater flexibility, culminating in the March 2003 supplemental request for tens of billions of relatively unfettered authority. Congress reacted strongly and not just refused to provide the flexibility sought; in doing so, it all but eliminated the delegated authority previously authorized. Why? Incentives changed.
Numerous incentives exist for Congress to attempt to actively influence Defense Department policy, budgets and internal management practices, and many means exist to carry out its oversight and policy direction. In the case of the DERF, Congress did not exercise most of these tools at first because sufficient incentive did not exist; in fact disincentives to micromanage were present. The incentive for Congress to support the president's request was greater than the incentive to intrusively manage DOD budget execution. In fact, the incentive for members was to appear to be as patriotic or more so than political opponents, partially explaining why, when the president requested a $20 billion supplemental appropriation, Congress quickly appropriated $40 billion. Combating terrorism is not specific to any congressional district or set of constituents. In the crisis climate immediately after 9/11, partisan politics were minimized, but only temporarily. At that point, attempts to manipulate defense and national security appropriations for parochial interests would have been politically inappropriate. It is apparent that Congress did not, in fact, delegate much budget authority to the Defense Department as a deliberate choice. Rather, Congress did not perceive an advantage in denying such authority. Congress, at first, had political reasons to restrain itself. However, once the political environment changed and with it the shift in the incentive structure, Congress shifted from delegation to activism, returning to familiar patterns of behavior.
CONCLUSION
We may anticipate that some critics of our study and findings might observe, in effect, ''so what else is new?'' What our research contributes to the literature is a detailed empirical study of an exceptional case with regard to congressional control of defense budgeting, a circumstance where Congress denied itself the opportunity to micromanage and delegated significant budget execution authority to DOD. The conventional wisdom relative to Congress is, essentially, that it is not capable of relaxing such control. We demonstrate that such is not always the case. With DERF, as with the process for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), under some circumstances Congress is willing to delegate a considerable degree of control. 40 However, when conditions change the delegation may be withdrawn. This has not happened with BRAC, but it did with the DERF.
The purpose of this study was not to criticize either Congress or the DOD relative to the degree of delegation of management and budget authority provided to DOD. Rather, our intent was to explore the circumstances under which Congress is more or less likely to delegate budget execution authority. The case study of DERF provides insights into the variables that influence the degree and types of delegation Congress will support. We have demonstrated that under conditions where there is a perception of high uncertainty and significant imminent threat to U.S. national security, Congress responds to DOD requests for increased delegation. Once uncertainty or immediacy is reduced, and after the foreign policy objectives of the executive branch become clearFand where these objectives and the means for achieving them become more controversialFCongress is far less likely to delegate authority to the executive branch and to the DOD. 
